cyber weapons

Conventional arms transfers – Exports (US$ millions – 2005; 1990 prices). Refers to the voluntary transfer of weapons destined for the armed forces or intelligence agencies of another country. It includes ships, aircraft, missiles, artillery, armored vehicles and guidance and radar systems. It excludes trucks, services, ammunition, small arms, support items, components and component technology. SOURCE: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

The 193 United Nations diplomats are driving a treaty that would be the first legally binding global treaty that would regulate the international arms trade. This treaty is expected to promote transparency and accountability in the arms trade. This is not new! Keep reading →


Cyber investigators looking at the Stuxnet code determined that on June 24th the sophisticated cyber weapon would stop operating and remove itself from the systems it had infiltrated.

This function was identified long ago and cyber researchers have patiently waited to see what if any implications this will have on the tens of thousands of computers in more than 155 countries the sophisticated cyber weapon had infected. By all accounts this is a self-destruction, an unusual function not often seen embedded within malicious code. The inclusion of this function is a strong indicator that those behind this cyber attack did not believe that Iran would discover the malicious code. Keep reading →

The big news reverberating through cybersecurity circles last week, reported by the New York Times, that the U.S. was behind the Stuxnet cyber attack on Iranian nuclear enrichments back in 2010 has set off a new firestorm of concern about the likelihood of retaliation.

The news report was based on information provided by “unnamed participants in the program.” In the article it states that the information in the piece was called an “account of the American and Israeli effort to undermine the Iranian nuclear program is based on interviews over the past 18 months with current and former American, European and Israeli officials involved in the program, as well as a range of outside experts.” Keep reading →

In a move that suggests the incendiary impact of malicious software, Iran has now publicly threatened the United States over the Flame malware incident that has gained worldwide attention in recent days.

Flame has been dubbed the “utlimate spy” and for good reason. Iran was the country hit the hardest by the state-of-the-art piece of malware. Keep reading →

It happened again. A number of countries have been hit by what has been called the most sophisticated piece of malware seen to date.

The malware is called Flame – appropriate given the number of computers that have been burned by this latest cyber weapon. Keep reading →


In recent years, Joint Special Operations Forces (JSOF) around the world have experienced a fair amount of growth. This growth has resulted in a rapid increase in their ranks, a boost in their budgets and an expansion of the scope of their missions.

This growth was further accelerated by the widely publicized Special Operations Forces that were used in the killing of Osama bin Laden. In a press conference from the Pentagon President Obama with Defense Secretary Leon Panetta articulated their vision of the future military.

The new vision states that “we will continue to build and sustain tailored capabilities appropriate for counter terrorism and irregular warfare.” That vision, which was reinforced in a blog post by Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, means growth for JSOF, but does that mean growth into cyber?

Secretary of Defense Panetta made it clear that the Defense Department must invest more in cyber capabilities saying, “Modern armed forces cannot conduct high-tempo, effective operations without reliable information and communication networks and assured access to cyberspace.”

While he did not mention offensive cyber capabilities you can be sure that is a critical capability that will see additional investment.

What if cyber becomes an increased focus and capability of our JSOFs?

As a general principal, our military must protect critical cyber assets while attacking the enemy’s cyber capabilities. Integrating cyber with JSOFs makes allot of sense and will only increase the weaponry and ultimately the value they provide.

Full integration of cyberspace operations into the traditional air-land-sea battle space is not an option! The covert missions carried out by JSOF are among the riskiest and are of the greatest value in the pursuit of national security.

A Joint Special Cyber Operations capability is not an option. Rather, it is a necessity in the highly contested domain of cyber space.


Kevin G. Coleman is a long-time security technology executive and former Chief Strategist at Netscape. He is Senior Fellow with the Technolytics Institute, where he provides consulting services on strategic technology and security issues.

COMMENTARY:
The race to keep pace with conventional arms development recently ran head long into the race for cyber dominance–and sustained an eye-opening set-back.

These weapons programs take years to develop and typically cost billions of dollars. But the damage goes far beyond the dollars spent on the program to date. The loss of time in the conventional arms race is perhaps the biggest area of loss and the greatest concern for Defense Department strategic planners. Keep reading →

COMMENTARY:
A new arms race began a few years back and its rapid revolutions will make the cold war era look like a minuscule research project for a white paper!

The new race is to develop offensive, defensive and intelligence collection capabilities for cyber space operations. Keep reading →

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